THE ROLE OF THE IMAGINATION IN KANT'S THEORY OF EXPERIENCE
Wilfrid Sellars
Page 2
Source: http://www.ditext.com/sellars/ikte.html
II
12. I shall prepare the way for the next major step in the argument by changing my example. Consider the visual perception of a red apple. Apples are red on the outside (have a red skin) but white inside. Other features of apples are relevant, but this will do to begin with. The initial point to be made about the apple is that we see it not only as having a red surface but as white inside. This, however, is just the beginning. Notice that the experience contains an actual quantity of red. By "actual quantity of red" I mean a quantity of red which is not merely believed to exist as did the Fountain of Youth for Ponce de Leon. The Fountain of Youth does not actually exist. By contrast, the quantity of red which is a constituent of the visual experience of the apple not only actually exists but is actually or, to use a familiar metaphor, bodily present in the experience.
13. But what of the volume of white apple flesh which the apple is seen as containing? Many philosophers would be tempted to say that it is present in the experiencemerely by virtue of being believed in. It has, of course, actual existence as a constituent of the apple, but, they would insist, it is not present in its actuality. Phenomenologists have long insisted that this would be a mistake. As they see it, an actual volume of white is present in the experience in a way which parallels the red. We experience the redas containing the white.
14. But if what is experienced is red-containing-white as red-containing-white, and if both the red and the white are actualities actually present, how are we to account for the fact that there is a legitimate sense in which we don't see the inside of the apple? To be sure, we see the apple as white inside, but we don't see the whiteness of the inside of the apple.
15. We must add another distinction, this time between what we see and what we see of what we see. The point is a delicate one to which justice must be done if we are not to be derailed. Thus when I see a closed book, the following are all typically true.
(a) I see the book.
(b) The book has pages inside.
(c) I see the book as having pages inside.
(d) I do not see the inside pages.
(e) The book has a back cover.
(f) I see the book as having a back cover.
(g) I do not see the back cover.
16. How can a volume of white apple flesh be present as actuality in the visual experience if it is not seen? The answer should be obvious. It is present by virtue of beingimagined. (Notice that to get where we have arrived, much more phenomenology must have been done than is explicitly being done on this occasion. We are drawing on a store of accumulated wisdom.)
17. But notice where this leads us. The actual volume of white is experienced as contained in the actual volume of red. Yet if the actuality of the white apple flesh consists in it being imagined, it must be dependent for its existence on the perceiver; it must, in a sense to be analyzed, be "in" the perceiver.
18. Before following up this point, it should be noticed that the same is true of the red of the other side of the apple. The apple is seen as having a red opposite side. Furthermore, the phenomenologist adds, the red of the opposite side is not merely believed in; it is bodily present in the experience. Like the white, not being seen, it is present in the experience by being imagined.
19. Notice that to say that it is present in the experience by virtue of being imagined is not to say that it is presented as imagined. The fruits of careful phenomenological description are not to be read from experience by one who runs. Red may present itself as red and white present itself as white; but sensations do not present themselves assensations, nor images as images. Otherwise philosophy would be far easier than it is.
20. The phenomenologist now asks us to take into account a phenomenon frequently noted, but as frequently misinterpreted. Consider the snow seen on a distant mountain. It looks cool. Do we see the whiteness of the snow, but only believe in its coolth. Perhaps this is sometimes so; but surely not always. Sometimes actual coolth is present in the experience, as was the white inside the apple and the red on the opposite side. Once again, we do not see the coolth of the snow, but we see the snow as cool; and we experience the actual coolth as we experience the actual whiteness of the snow. An actual coolness is bodily present in the experience as is an actual volume of white.
21. Let us combine our results into one example. We see the cool red apple. We see it as red on the facing side, as red on the opposite side, and as containing a volume of cool white apple flesh. We do not see of the apple its opposite side, or its inside, or its internal whiteness, or its coolness, or its juiciness. But while these features are notseen, they are not merely believed in. These features are present in the object of perception as actualities. They are present by virtue of being imagined.
22. We must introduce a further refinement. We see an apple. We see it as an apple. Do we see of it its applehood? We see a copper penny. We see it as a copper penny. Do we see of it its consisting-of-copperness? We see a lump of sugar. We see it as white and as soluble. We see of it its whiteness. Do we see of it its solubility? The answer to the last question is surely negative, as are the questions concerning applehood and copperness, and for the same reason. Aristotle would put it by saying that we see ofobjects only their occurrent proper and common sensible features. We do not see of objects their causal properties, though we see them as having them.
23. To draw the proper consequences of this we must distinguish between imagining and imaging, just as we distinguish between perceiving and sensing. Indeed the distinction to be drawn is essentially the same in both cases. Roughly imagining is an intimate blend of imaging and conceptualization, whereas perceiving is an intimate blend of sensing and imaging and conceptualization. Thus, imagining a cool juicy red apple (as a cool juicy red apple) is a matter of (a) imaging a unified structure containing as aspects images of a volume of white, surrounded by red, and of mutually pervading volumes of juiciness and coolth, (b) conceptualizing this unified image-structure as a cool juicy red apple. Notice that the proper and common sensible features enter in both by virtue of being actual features of the image and by virtue of being items thought of or conceptualized. The applehood enters in only by virtue of being thought of (intentional in-existence).
24. On the other hand, seeing a cool juicy red apple (as a cool juicy red apple) is a matter of (a) sensing-cum-imaging a unified structure containing as aspects images of a volume of white, a sensed half-apple shaped shell of red, and an image or a volume of juiciness pervaded by a volume of white; (b) conceptualizing this unified sense-image structure as a cool juicy red apple. Notice that the proper and common sensible features enter in both by virtue of being actual features of the sense image structure and by virtue of being items conceptualized and believed in. As before, the applehood enters in only by virtue of being thought of (believed in).
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